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2Abstract
The problem of promoting the evolution of cooperative behaviour within populations of self-
regarding individuals has been intensively investigated across diverse fields of behavioural, so-
cial and computational sciences. In most studies, cooperation is assumed to emerge from the
combined actions of participating individuals within the populations, without taking into ac-
count the possibility of external interference and how it can be performed in a cost-efficient way.
Here, we bridge this gap by studying a cost-efficient interference model based on evolutionary
game theory, where an exogenous decision-maker aims to ensure high levels of cooperation
from a population of individuals playing the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma, at a minimal cost.
We derive analytical conditions for which an interference scheme or strategy can guarantee a
given level of cooperation while at the same time minimising the total cost of investment (for
rewarding cooperative behaviours), and show that the results are highly sensitive to the inten-
sity of selection by interference. Interestingly, we show that a simple class of interference that
makes investment decisions based on the population composition can lead to significantly more
cost-efficient outcomes than standard institutional incentive strategies, especially in the case of
weak selection.
Keywords: evolutionary games, cooperation, external interference, cost efficiency, optimisa-
tion.
31 Introduction1
The study of the evolution of cooperation in populations of self-interested individuals has been2
given significant attention in a number of disciplines, ranging from Evolutionary Biology, Eco-3
nomics, Physics, Computer Science and Social Science. Various mechanisms that can promote4
the emergence and stability of cooperative behaviours among such individuals, have been pro-5
posed1–4. They include kin and group selection 5,6, direct and indirect reciprocities 7–11, spatial6
networks12–19, reward and punishment 20–25, and pre-commitments26–30. In these works, the7
evolution of cooperation is typically originated from the emergence and stability of participat-8
ing individuals’ strategic behaviours, which are cooperative in nature (e.g. direct reciprocity9
interactions are dominated by reciprocal strategies such as tit-for-tat like strategies, who tend to10
cooperate with alike individuals, leading to end populations with high levels of cooperation8).11
In other words, these mechanisms are incorporated as part of individual strategic behaviours, in12
order to study how they evolve in presence of other possible behaviours and whether that leads13
to a better outcome for cooperative behaviour.14
However, in many scenarios, cooperation promotion or advocation is carried out by an ex-15
ternal decision-maker or agent (i.e. the agent does not belong to the system). For instance,16
international institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union, are not inside17
parties to any nation’s political life (and thus, can be considered as an outsider from that nation18
political parties’ perspective), might want to promote a certain preferred political behaviour31.19
To do so, the organisation can provide financial support to political parties that choose to follow20
the preferred politics. Another example is wildlife management organisations (e.g., the WWF)21
aiming to maintain a desired level of biodiversity of a certain region. To do so, the organisa-22
tion, which is not part of the region’s eco-system, has to decide whether to modify the current23
population of some species, and if so, then when, and to what degree she is required to interfere24
4in the eco-system (i.e., modify the size and the biodiversity of the population)32,33. Since a25
more efficient population controlling typically implies more physical actions, thereby requiring26
higher (monetary) expenses in both human resources and equipments, the organisation has to27
balance between an efficient management and a low total investment cost. Moreover, under28
evolutionary dynamics of an eco-system, consisting of various stochastic effects such as those29
resulting from behavioural update and mutation, undesired behaviours can reoccur over time, if30
the interference was not sufficiently or efficiently carried out in the past. Given this, the external31
decision-maker also has to take into account the fact that she will have to repeatedly interfere32
in the eco-system, in order to sustain the level of the desired behaviour over time. That is,33
she has to find an efficient iterative interference scheme that leads to her desired goals, while34
minimising the total cost of interference.35
Herein we study how to promote the evolution of cooperation within a well-mixed pop-36
ulation or system of self-regarding individuals or players, from the perspective of external37
decision-makers. The individuals’ interaction is modelled using the one-shot (i.e. non-repeated)38
Prisoner’s Dilemma, where defection is always preferred to cooperation 1,6,7,12. Suppose that the39
external decision-maker has a budget to use to intervene in the system by rewarding particular40
individuals in the population at specific moments. Such a decision is conditional on the cur-41
rent behavioural composition of individuals within the population, where at each time step or42
generation, those exhibiting a cooperative tendency are to be rewarded from the budget. How-43
ever, the defective (i.e. non-cooperative) behaviour can reoccur over time through a mutation44
or exploration process34 and become prevalent in the population; thus, the decision-maker has45
to repeatedly interfere in the system in order to maintain the desired abundance of cooperators46
in the long run.47
The research question here is to determine when to make an investment (i.e., pay or reward48
a cooperative act) at each time step, and by how much, in order to achieve our desired ratio49
5of cooperation within the population such that the total cost of interference is minimised. We50
formalise this general problem of cost-efficient interference as a bi-objective optimisation prob-51
lem, where the first objective is to provide a sequential interference scheme (i.e., a sequence52
of interference decisions over time) that maximises the frequency of cooperative behaviours53
within the population, while the second is to minimise the expected total cost of interference.54
We will describe general conditions ensuring that an interference scheme can achieve a55
certain level of cooperation. Moreover, given a budget, we investigate how spreading the in-56
terference scheme should be to achieve a desired level of cooperation at a minimal cost. In57
other words, we will identify under what condition of the population composition should one58
stop making costly interference without affecting the desired cooperative outcome? To this59
end, we will develop an individual-based investment scheme that generalises the standard mod-60
els of institutional incentives (i.e. institutional reward and punishment)35–38 where incentives61
are provided conditionally on the composition of the population. Our analysis shows that this62
individual-based investment strategy is more cost-effective than the standard models of institu-63
tional incentives for a wide range of parameter values.64
2 Results65
2.1 Interference scheme in finite populations66
Let us consider a well-mixed, finite population of N self-regarding players, who interact with67
each other using the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), where a player can be either a cooper-68
6ator (C) or defector (D) strategy. The payoff matrix of the PD is given as follows69

C D
C R,R S, T
D T, S P, P
.
70
That is, if both players choose to play C or D, they both receive the same reward R for mutual71
cooperation or penalty P for mutual defection. For the unilateral cooperation case, the cooper-72
ative player receives the payoff S and the defective one receives payoff T . The payoff matrix73
corresponds to the preferences associated with the PD when the parameters satisfy the ordering74
T > R > P > S. Extensive theoretical analysis has shown that for cooperation to evolve in a75
PD certain mechanisms such as repetition of interactions, reputation effects, kin and group re-76
lations, structured populations, or pre-commitments, need to be introduced2 (cf. Introduction).77
Differently, in the current study we focus on how an external decision-maker can interfere in78
such a population of C and D players to achieve high levels of cooperation in a cost-efficient79
way.80
Indeed, with a limited budget, we analyse what would be the optimal interference or in-81
vestment scheme that leads to the highest possible frequency of cooperation. In the current82
well-mixed population setting, an interference scheme solely depends on the current composi-83
tion of the population, i.e., whenever the population consists of i C players (and thus, N − i D84
players), a total investment, θi, is made. That is, each C player’s average payoff is increased by85
an amount θi/i. Let Θ = {θ1, ...., θN−1} be the overall interference scheme. Our goal is thus86
to find Θ that minimises the expected (total) cost of interference while maximising or at least87
ensuring a certain level of cooperation.88
Besides providing the analysis for such a general interference scheme, we will consider an89
7individual-based investment scheme where there is a fixed investment per C-player, i.e. θi =90
i× θ. This individual-based merit or rewarding is widespread, as are the cases for scholarships91
and performance based payments39. Within this scheme, we investigate whether one should92
spend the budget on a small number of C players rather than spreading it to pay all C players93
though that might not be sufficient for them to survive (especially when the resource is limited).94
That is, a C player might not be competitive or strong enough to survive when receiving a too95
small investment, leading to the waste of such an investment. To do so, we consider investment96
schemes that reward C players whenever their frequency or number in the population does not97
exceed a given threshold t, where 1 ≤ t ≤ N − 1. Hence, we have θk = k × θ ∀k ≤ t and = 098
otherwise.99
It is noteworthy that this interference scheme generalises incentive strategies typically con-100
sidered in the literature of institutional incentives modelling, i.e. institutional reward and pun-101
ishment36–38, where incentives are always provided regardless of the population composition.102
That is, those works only consider the most extreme case of the individual-based incentive103
scheme where t = N − 1 (denoted by FULL-INVEST). Our analysis below shows that in most104
cases there is a wide range of t that leads to a lower total cost of investment than FULL-INVEST105
while guaranteeing the same cooperation outcome.106
2.2 Cost-effective interference that ensures cooperation107
We now derive the expected cost of interference with respect to the interference scheme Θ. We108
adopt here the finite population dynamics with the Fermi strategy update rule40 (see Methods),109
stating the probability that a player A with fitness fA adopts the strategy of another player B110
with fitness fB is given by the Fermi function, i.e PA,B =
(
1 + e−β(fB−fA)
)−1, where β stands111
for the selection intensity.112
We now derive the formula for the expected number of times that the population consists113
8of i C players. To that end, let us denote by Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ N , the state in which the population114
consists of i C players (and thus, N − i D players). These (N + 1) states define an absorbing115
Markov chain, with S0 and SN being the absorbing states. Let U = {uij}N−1i,j=1 be the transition116
matrix between the transient states, i.e. {S1, ..., SN−1}. Clearly, U forms a tridiagonal matrix117
(i.e. uk,k±j = 0 ∀j ≥ 2), with the elements on the upper and lower diagonals being defined by118
the probabilities that the number of C players (k) in the population is increased or decreased by119
1, respectively. These probabilities are denoted by T±(k) (see Methods); thus, uk,k±1 = T±(k).120
Finally, the elements on the main diagonal of U are defined as, uk,k = 1 − uk,k+1 − uk,k−1 =121
1− T+(k)− T−(k).122
As such, we can form the (so-called) fundamental matrix N = {nij}N−1i,j=1 = (I − U)−1,123
where nij defines the expected number of times the population spends in the state Sj given124
that it starts from (non-absorbing) state Si 41. Thus, assuming that a mutant can occur, with125
equal probability, at either of the homogeneous population states where the population consists126
of only C or D players (i.e. S0 or SN ), the expected number of visits at state Si is given by:127
(n1i + nN−1,i)/2. Therefore, the expected interference or investment cost for the investment128
scheme Θ = {θ1, ...., θN−1} is given by,129
EC =
1
2
N−1∑
i=1
(n1i + nN−1,i)θi. (1)
We now calculate the frequency (or fraction) of cooperation when the interference scheme Θ =130
{θ1, ...., θN−1} is applied. Since the population consists of only two strategies, the fixation131
probabilities of a C (respectively, D) player in a (homogeneous) population of D (respectively,132
9C) players when the interference scheme is carried out are (see Methods), respectively,133
ρD,C =
(
1 +
N−1∑
i=1
i∏
k=1
1 + eβ(Πk(C)−Πk(D)+θk/k)
1 + e−β(Πk(C)−Πk(D)+θk/k)
)−1
,
ρC,D =
(
1 +
N−1∑
i=1
i∏
k=1
1 + eβ(Πk(D)−Πk(C)−θk/k)
1 + e−β(Πk(D)−Πk(C)−θk/k)
)−1
.
(2)
Computing the stationary distribution using these fixation probabilities, we obtain the frequency
of cooperation (see Methods)
ρD,C
ρD,C + ρC,D
.
Hence, this frequency of cooperation can be maximised by maximising134
max
Θ
(ρD,C/ρC,D) . (3)
The fraction in Equation (3) can be simplified as follows34135
ρD,C
ρC,D
=
N−1∏
k=1
T−(k)
T+(k)
=
N−1∏
k=1
1 + eβ[Πk(C)−Πk(D)+θk/k]
1 + e−β[Πk(C)−Πk(D)+θk/k]
= eβ
∑N−1
k=1 (Πk(C)−Πk(D)+θk/k)
= eβ(N(R+S−T−P )/2+(P−R)+
∑N−1
k=1 θk/k). (4)
In the above transformation, T−(k) and T+(k) are the probabilities to increase or decrease the136
number of C players (i.e. k) by one in each time step, respectively (see Methods for details).137
Since the payoff matrix entries of the PD (i.e. R, T, P, S) are fixed, in order to guarantee a138
certain level of cooperation, we only need to examine the following quantity (which increases139
with Θ)140
G =
N−1∑
k=1
θk/k. (5)
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In short, the described optimisation problem is reduced to the problem of finding an interference141
scheme, Θ = {θ1, ...., θN−1}, that maximises the level of cooperation within the population, by142
maximising G, while minimising the expected interference cost EC, as defined in Equation143
(1).144
2.3 Sufficient conditions for achieving cooperation by the overall scheme145
We now derive conditions for the overall interference scheme Θ that can ensure a certain level
of cooperation. In particular, from Equation (4), we can derive that cooperation has larger basin
of attraction than that of defection (i.e., ρD,C > ρC,D)2 if and only if
G ≥ N(T + P −R− S)/2 + (R− P ).
In this case, this condition also means there will be at least 50% of cooperation. There is exactly146
50% cooperation when β = 0, i.e. under neutral selection, regardless of the interference scheme147
in place. It implies that under neutral selection, it is optimal to make no investment at all, i.e.148
θi = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1.149
We henceforth only consider non-neutral selection, i.e. β > 0. Generally, assuming that we150
desire to obtain at least an ω ∈ [0, 1] fraction of cooperation, i.e. ρD,C
ρD,C+ρC,D
≥ ω, it follows from151
Equation (4) that152
G ≥ 1
β
log
(
ω
1− ω
)
+N(T + P −R− S)/2 + (R− P ). (6)
Therefore it is guaranteed that if Θ satisfies this inequality, at least an ω fraction of cooperation153
can be expected. From this condition it implies that the lower bound of G monotonically de-154
pends on β. Namely, when ω ≥ 0.5, it increases with β while decreases for ω < 0.5. Note that155
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G is an increasing function of the overall interference cost (vector) Θ.156
2.4 Sufficient conditions for individual-based scheme157
We now apply this general condition to the individual-based investment scheme defined above.158
Recall that in this case, θk = k × θ ∀k ≤ t and = 0 otherwise. Thus, G = t × θ. Hence, to159
obtain at least ω fraction of cooperation the per-individual investment cost θ needs to satisfy160
that161
θ ≥ 1
t
(
1
β
log
(
ω
1− ω
)
+N(T + P −R− S)/2 + (R− P )
)
. (7)
On the other hand, the threshold t must satisfy that162
t ≥ 1
θ
(
1
β
log
(
ω
1− ω
)
+N(T + P −R− S)/2 + (R− P )
)
. (8)
These conditions suggest that, when ω ≥ 0.5, the smaller the intensity of selection (β) is,163
the larger the threshold of the per-individual investment (θ) as well as the higher the threshold164
for how spreading the investment must be (t) are required to achieve a given ω fraction of165
cooperation. It is reversed for ω < 0.5.166
2.5 Intermediate t leads to cost-effective investment strategies167
We now provide numerical simulation results for the individual-based investment scheme, com-168
puting the resulting stationary distribution in a population consisting of the two strategies, C and169
D (see Methods). Namely, Figure 1a shows the level of cooperation as a function of the thresh-170
old t, for different values of the cost, θ. As expected, the level of cooperation obtained increases171
when t or θ increases. When θ is too small (see θ = 1), defection is prevalent, namely, it is al-172
ways more frequent than cooperation, even when the investment is always made (i.e. t = N−1).173
12
When this investment cost is large enough, a high level of cooperation can be sustained with a174
large t, i.e. when the investment is sufficiently spreading. The results are in accordance with the175
theoretical results in Equations (7) and (8). For instance, with θ = 1, to reach at least ω = 0.4176
(fraction of cooperation), it must satisfy that t ≥ 97. To reach at least ω = 0.5, it must satisfy177
that t ≥ 101, which means it is not possible to reach this level of cooperation given the cost. On178
the other hand, with sufficiently high values of the cost, one can reach significant cooperation179
with a rather small threshold for t. For example, with θ = 5 and 40, one can reach 99% of180
cooperation (i.e. ω = 0.99) whenever t ≥ 30 and t ≥ 4, respectively.181
Thus, a question arises as to whether it is always the case that a more spreading interference182
scheme requires a larger budget (EC)? In other words, should we simply use the smallest pos-183
sible value of t that leads to the required level of cooperation? When stochastic factors, such184
as mutation and frequency-dependence dynamics, are absent, clearly that is the case. However,185
when such stochastic factors are present, the answer is not obvious anymore. Indeed, as shown186
in Figure 1c, when t reaches a threshold, a more spreading investment scheme can actually lead187
to decrease in the total investment. This observation can be explained by looking at the expected188
number of times of investment (i.e. the total number of visits at states Si, i ≤ t), in Figure 1b,189
for varying t. Even when the number of C-players in the population is rather large (i.e. large190
t), an investment might still be required as otherwise defection has a chance to resurface, thus191
wasting the earlier efforts and requiring further investments. However, when number of C play-192
ers reaches a threshold (of approximately 90%), these C players can maintain their abundance193
by themselves, without requiring further investments.194
Thus, as observed from results in Figure 1, there is an intermediate value of t where an195
optimal (i.e. lowest) expected cost of investment is achieved. We denote this optimal value of196
t by t?. We now study how robust this observation is. Indeed, Figure 2 shows t? for varying θ,197
for different intensities of selection β and required levels of cooperation ω. In general, the value198
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of t? decreases with θ and increases with ω (comparing ω = 0.1, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9). When β is199
sufficiently small (see panels for β = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1), an intermediate value of t? is always200
observed, while when β is sufficiently large (see the panel for β = 1), t? must be the largest201
possible, i.e. t? = N − 1. That is, whenever selection is not too strong, we would expect to202
find the optimal interference scheme not always making an investment in cooperators, and the203
smaller the selection strength, the less spreading an investment scheme should be. As such, we204
might expect a wide range of t that leads to investment schemes that are more cost-effective205
than FULL-INVEST.206
Indeed, in Figure 3, we study the range of t (grey area) that leads to investment schemes207
better than FULL-INVEST (i.e. t = N − 1), guaranteeing at least ω fraction of cooperation.208
We show that for varying θ, for different values of ω as well as intensities of selection β. In209
general, for a given required level of cooperation to be achieved, ω, there is a large range of t210
where it leads to a more cost-efficient strategy than the FULL-INVEST. This range is larger for211
a weaker intensity of selection β.212
3 Discussion213
In summary, the present work seeks to answer the question of how to interfere in a population214
of self-interested players in order to promote high cooperation in a cost-effective way. In par-215
ticular, the cost of interference is measured as the consumption of certain resources, and the216
higher impact we want to make, the higher cost we have to pay. To tackle this problem, we have217
developed a cost-efficient interference model based on evolutionary game methods in finite pop-218
ulations. In our model, an exogenous decision-maker aims to optimise the cost of interference219
while guaranteeing a certain minimum level of cooperation, having to decide whether and how220
much to invest (in rewarding cooperative behaviours) at each time step. For a general investment221
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scheme, we have obtained the sufficient conditions for the scheme to achieve a concrete level of222
cooperation. Moreover, we have provided numerical analyses for a specific investment scheme223
that makes a fixed investment in a cooperator (i.e. individual-based investment) whenever the224
cooperation frequency in the population is below a threshold t (representing how widespread225
the investment should be to optimise the total cost of investment).226
This individual-based scheme can be considered a more general form of the prevalent mod-227
els of institutional incentive strategies, such as institutional punishment and reward35–38,42–46,228
which do not take into account the behavioural composition or state of the population. Typically,229
only the most extreme case is considered where incentives are always provided (punishment for230
defectors and reward for cooperators), which corresponds to t = N − 1 of the individual-based231
scheme. Our results have shown that whenever the intensity of selection is not too strong, an232
intermediate value of the threshold t leads to a minimal total cost of investment while guaran-233
teeing at least a given desired fraction of population cooperation. Furthermore, there is a wide234
range of the threshold twhere individual-based investment is more cost-effective than the above235
mentioned institutional incentive strategies; and the smaller the intensity of selection, the wider236
this range is.237
Note that our work is also different from the existing institutional incentive models35–38,42–46,238
as well as the existing literature on the evolution of cooperation1–4, in that, its aim is to minimise239
the cost of interference while guaranteeing high levels of cooperation, while cost-efficiency is240
mostly ignored in in those works. Similarly, our work also differs from EGT literature on241
optimal control in networked populations47–49, where cost-efficiency is not considered. Instead,242
these works on controllability focus on identifying which individuals or nodes are the most243
important to control (i.e. where individuals can be assigned strategies as control inputs), for244
different population structures.245
Moreover, it is important to note that in the context of institutional incentives modelling, a246
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crucial issue is the question of how to maintain the budget of incentives providing. The problem247
of who pays or contributes to the budget is a social dilemma itself, and how to escape this248
dilemma is critical research question. Facilitating solutions include pool incentives with second249
order punishments42, democratic decisions37, positive and negative incentives combination36250
and spatial populations44, just to name a few. Our work does not address this issue of who251
to contribute to the budget, but rather focus on how to optimise the spending, given a budget252
already, which has not been addressed by these works. However, it would be interesting to study253
whether (and how) interference strategies should be customised for different types of incentive254
providers, which we aim to study in future work.255
Furthermore, related to our work here is a large body of research on (sequential) decision-256
making in Artificial Intelligence and Multi-agent systems, which provide a number of tech-257
niques for making a sequence of decisions that lead to optimal behaviour of a system (e.g., a258
desired level of biodiversity), while minimising the total cost of making such decisions50–54.259
However, these lines of research often omit the agents’s intrinsic strategic behaviours, which260
clearly have a crucial role in driving the evolutionary dynamics and outcomes of agents’ in-261
teractions. Thus, these works failed to exploit the system intrinsic properties, and hence, not262
able to efficiently achieve a desired outcome and system status (e.g., the status quo between the263
fighting opponents, or the desired diversity of population).264
On the other hand, game theoretic literature, which deals with agents’ intrinsic strategic265
behaviours, usually need to make simplistic assumptions. For instance, it is often the case that266
the system is assumed to be fully closed, having no external decision-makers; or, when there is267
an external decision-maker, he or she can fully control the system agents’ strategic behaviour.268
Examples of closed systems assumption are classical game theoretical models, see e.g. refer-269
ences52,55,56. Approaches that require full control of agents’ behaviours are for example works270
from mechanism design, where the decision-maker is the system designer, who defines norms271
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and penalties to ensure that agents are incentivised not to deviate from the desired behaviour,272
see e.g. references57–60. Therefore, these works are not suitable to tackle our settings either.273
Based on the general model we developed here, more efficient interference strategies can274
be studied. In particular, it would be interesting to consider more adaptive interference strate-275
gies, which modify the amount and the frequency of investment dynamically depending on the276
current state of the system. The analysis of the resulting systems, however, is not straight-277
forward, as it remains unclear whether to increase or decrease the amount/frequency of in-278
vestments will lead to more efficient performance. Moreover, we aim to extend our analysis279
to systems with other, more complicated scenarios such as structured populations and multi-280
player games, where more behavioural equilibria61–63 and structure-dependent13,19 interference281
strategies might be required to ensure cost-efficiency. In the former case, interference strategies282
would need to take into account the structural information in a network such as the cooperative283
properties in a neighbourhood (for the results of cost-efficient interference strategies in square284
lattice populations, see our recent work in reference64). In the latter case, the strategies might285
need to consider the group size as well as cooperative properties in the group to decide whether286
to make an investment.287
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4 Methods288
Both the analytical and numerical results obtained here use Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT)289
methods for finite populations34,65,66. A similar description of the Methods section was used in290
references67,68. In such a setting, players’ payoff represents their fitness or social success, and291
evolutionary dynamics is shaped by social learning3,69, whereby the most successful players292
will tend to be imitated more often by the other players. In the current work, social learning is293
modeled using the so-called pairwise comparison rule40, assuming that a player A with fitness294
fA adopts the strategy of another player B with fitness fB with probability given by the Fermi295
function, PA,B =
(
1 + e−β(fB−fA)
)−1, where β conveniently describes the selection intensity296
(β = 0 represents neutral drift while β →∞ represents increasingly deterministic selection).297
For convenience of numerical computations, but without affecting analytical results, we298
assume here small mutation limit65,66,70. As such, at most two strategies are present in the popu-299
lation simultaneously, and the behavioural dynamics can thus be described by a Markov Chain,300
where each state represents a homogeneous population and the transition probabilities between301
any two states are given by the fixation probability of a single mutant65,66,70. The resulting302
Markov Chain has a stationary distribution, which describes the average time the population303
spends in an end state.304
Now, the average payoffs in a population of k A players and (N −k) B players can be given305
as below (recall that N is the population size), respectively,306
ΠA(k) =
(k − 1)piA,A + (N − k)piA,B
N − 1 , ΠB(k) =
kpiB,A + (N − k − 1)piB,B
N − 1 . (9)
Thus, the fixation probability that a single mutant A taking over a whole population with (N−1)307
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B players is as follows (see e.g. references for details40,65,71)308
ρB,A =
(
1 +
N−1∑
i=1
i∏
j=1
T−(j)
T+(j)
)−1
, (10)
where T±(k) = N−k
N
k
N
[
1 + e∓β[ΠA(k)−ΠB(k)]
]−1 describes the probability to change the number309
of A players by ± one in a time step. Specifically, when β = 0, ρB,A = 1/N , representing the310
transition probability at neural limit.311
Having obtained the fixation probabilities between any two states of a Markov chain, we312
can now describe its stationary distribution. Namely, considering a set of s strategies, {1, ..., s},313
their stationary distribution is given by the normalised eigenvector associated with the eigen-314
value 1 of the transposed of a matrix M = {Tij}si,j=1, where Tij,j 6=i = ρji/(s − 1) and315
Tii = 1−
∑s
j=1,j 6=i Tij . (See e.g. references
66,70 for further details).316
19
Acknowledgements317
Some preliminary results from this work was previously published as an extended abstract in318
AAMAS 2015 conference72.319
Data Availability320
No datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.321
Author Contributions322
T.A.H., L.T-T. designed the research. The models were implemented by T.A.H. Results were323
analysed and improved by T.A.H. and L.T-T. T.A.H. and L.T-T. wrote the paper together.324
Competing Interests325
none326
20
References327
1. Axelrod, R. & Hamilton, W. The evolution of cooperation. Science 211, 1390–1396328
(1981).329
2. Nowak, M. A. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science 314, 1560 (2006).330
DOI: 10.1126/science.1133755.331
3. Sigmund, K. The Calculus of Selfishness (Princeton University Press, 2010).332
4. Perc, M. et al. Statistical physics of human cooperation. Physics Reports 687, 1–51333
(2017).334
5. Hamilton, W. The genetical evolution of social behaviour. i. Journal of Theoretical335
Biology 7, 1 – 16 (1964).336
6. Traulsen, A. & Nowak, M. A. Evolution of cooperation by multilevel selection. Proc337
Natl Acad Sci USA 103, 10952 (2006).338
7. Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature 437 (2005).339
8. Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M. & Santos, F. C. Corpus-based intention recognition in cooper-340
ation dilemmas. Artificial Life journal 18, 365–383 (2012).341
9. Hilbe, C., Martinez-Vaquero, L. A., Chatterjee, K. & Nowak, M. A. Memory-n strategies342
of direct reciprocity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, 4715–4720343
(2017).344
10. Van Veelen, M., Garcı´a, J., Rand, D. G. & Nowak, M. A. Direct reciprocity in structured345
populations. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109, 9929–9934 (2012).346
21
11. Zisis, I., Di Guida, S., Han, T., Kirchsteiger, G. & Lenaerts, T. Generosity motivated347
by acceptance-evolutionary analysis of an anticipation game. Scientific reports 5, 18076348
(2015).349
12. Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M. & Lenaerts, T. Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in350
structured heterogeneous populations. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 103, 3490–3494 (2006).351
13. Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D. & Pacheco, J. M. Social diversity promotes the emergence352
of cooperation in public goods games. Nature 454, 213 (2008).353
14. Guala, F. Reciprocity: Weak or strong? what punishment experiments do (and do not)354
demonstrate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, 1 (2012).355
15. Garcı´a, J. & Traulsen, A. Leaving the loners alone: Evolution of cooperation in the356
presence of antisocial punishment. Journal of theoretical biology 307, 168–173 (2012).357
16. Chen, X., Szolnoki, A. & Perc, M. Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly358
punishment. New Journal of Physics 16, 083016 (2014).359
17. Pinheiro, F. L., Santos, M. D., Santos, F. C. & Pacheco, J. M. Origin of peer influence in360
social networks. Physical review letters 112, 098702 (2014).361
18. Perc, M., Go´mez-Garden˜es, J., Szolnoki, A., Florı´a, L. M. & Moreno, Y. Evolutionary362
dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: a review. Journal of The Royal363
Society Interface 10, 20120997 (2013).364
19. Pinheiro, F. L., Santos, F. C. & Pacheco, J. M. Linking individual and collective behavior365
in adaptive social networks. Physical review letters 116, 128702 (2016).366
20. Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. & Richerson, P. J. The evolution of altruistic punish-367
ment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100, 3531–3535 (2003).368
22
21. Sigmund, K., Hauert, C. & Nowak, M. Reward and punishment. Proc. Natl Acad Sci369
USA 98, 10757–10762 (2001).370
22. Herrmann, B., Tho¨ni, C. & Ga¨chter, S. Antisocial Punishment Across Societies. Science371
319, 1362–1367 (2008).372
23. Powers, S. T., Taylor, D. J. & Bryson, J. J. Punishment can promote defection in group-373
structured populations. Journal of theoretical biology 311, 107–116 (2012).374
24. Raihani, N. J. & Bshary, R. The reputation of punishers. Trends in ecology & evolution375
30, 98–103 (2015).376
25. Huang, F., Chen, X. & Wang, L. Conditional punishment is a double-edged sword in377
promoting cooperation. Scientific reports 8, 528 (2018).378
26. Nesse, R. M. Evolution and the capacity for commitment. Russell Sage Foundation379
series on trust (Russell Sage, 2001).380
27. Han, T. A., Moniz Pereira, L. & Lenaerts, T. Avoiding or Restricting Defectors in Public381
Goods Games? Journal of the Royal Society Interface 12, 20141203 (2015).382
28. Han, T., Pereira, L., Santos, F. & Lenaerts, T. Good agreements make good friends.383
Scientific reports 3 (2013).384
29. Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M. & Lenaerts, T. Evolution of commitment and level of partici-385
pation in public goods games. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 31, 561–583386
(2017).387
30. Sasaki, T., Okada, I., Uchida, S. & Chen, X. Commitment to cooperation and peer388
punishment: Its evolution. Games 6, 574–587 (2015).389
23
31. Dabelko, D. & Aaron, T. Water, conflict, and cooperation. Environmental Change and390
Security Project Report 10, 60–66 (2004).391
32. Levin, S. A. Multiple scales and the maintenance of biodiversity. Ecosystems 3, 498–506392
(2000).393
33. Ausden, M. Habitat Management for Conservation: A Handbook of Techniques 5. Tech-394
niques in Ecology & Conservation (Oxford University Press, 2007).395
34. Nowak, M. A. Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life (Harvard Uni-396
versity Press, Cambridge, MA, 2006).397
35. Hilbe, C. & Sigmund, K. Incentives and opportunism: from the carrot to the stick.398
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 277, 2427–2433399
(2010).400
36. Chen, X., Sasaki, T., Bra¨nnstro¨m, A˚. & Dieckmann, U. First carrot, then stick: how the401
adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation. Journal of the royal society402
interface 12, 20140935 (2015).403
37. Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., Ro¨hl, T. & Milinski, M. Democratic decisions establish stable404
authorities that overcome the paradox of second-order punishment. Proceedings of the405
National Academy of Sciences 111, 752–756 (2014).406
38. Wu, J.-J., Li, C., Zhang, B.-Y., Cressman, R. & Tao, Y. The role of institutional incentives407
and the exemplar in promoting cooperation. Scientific Reports 4, 6421 (2014).408
39. Lawler III, E. E. Rewarding excellence: Pay strategies for the new economy. (Jossey-409
Bass, 2000).410
24
40. Traulsen, A., Nowak, M. A. & Pacheco, J. M. Stochastic dynamics of invasion and411
fixation. Phys. Rev. E 74, 11909 (2006).412
41. Kemeny, J. & Snell, J. Finite Markov Chains. Undergraduate Texts in Mathematics413
(Springer, 1976).414
42. Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A. & Hauert, C. Social learning promotes institu-415
tions for governing the commons. Nature 466, 861 (2010).416
43. Sasaki, T., Bra¨nnstro¨m, A˚., Dieckmann, U. & Sigmund, K. The take-it-or-leave-it op-417
tion allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas. Proceedings of the National418
Academy of Sciences 109, 1165–1169 (2012).419
44. Perc, M. Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order420
free-riders. Scientific reports 2, 344 (2012).421
45. Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C. & Pacheco, J. M. A bottom-up institutional approach to422
cooperative governance of risky commons. Nature Climate Change 3, 797–801 (2013).423
46. Dos Santos, M. & Pen˜a, J. Antisocial rewarding in structured populations. Scientific424
Reports 7, 6212 (2017).425
47. Ramazi, P. & Cao, M. Analysis and control of strategic interactions in finite hetero-426
geneous populations under best-response update rule. In Decision and Control (CDC),427
2015 IEEE 54th Annual Conference on, 4537–4542 (IEEE, 2015).428
48. Riehl, J. R. & Cao, M. Towards optimal control of evolutionary games on networks.429
IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control 62, 458–462 (2017).430
25
49. Riehl, J. R. & Cao, M. Minimal-agent control of evolutionary games on tree networks.431
In The 21st International Symposium on Mathematical Theory of Networks and Systems,432
vol. 148 (2014).433
50. Madani, O., Lizotte, D. J. & Greiner, R. The budgeted multi–armed bandit problem.434
ICOLT ’04 643–645 (2004).435
51. Guha, S. & Munagala, K. Approximation algorithms for budgeted learning problems.436
STOC ’07 104–113 (2007).437
52. Bachrach, Y. et al. The cost of stability in coalitional games. In Algorithmic Game438
Theory, vol. 5814 of LNCS, 122–134 (2009).439
53. Tran-Thanh, L., Chapman, A., Rogers, A. & Jennings, N. R. Knapsack based optimal440
policies for budget–limited multi–armed bandits. AAAI ’12 1134–1140 (2012).441
54. Ding, W., Qin, T., Zhang, X.-D. & Liu, T.-Y. Multi-armed bandit with budget constraint442
and variable costs. In AAAI ’13, 232–238 (2013).443
55. Aziz, H., Brandt, F. & Harrenstein, P. Monotone cooperative games and their threshold444
versions. In AAMAS ’10, Toronto, Canada, May 10-14, 2010, Volume 1-3, 1107–1114445
(2010).446
56. Aadithya, K. V., Michalak, T. P. & Jennings, N. R. Representation of coalitional games447
with algebraic decision diagrams. In AAMAS ’11, Taipei, Taiwan, May 2-6, 2011, Volume448
1-3, 1121–1122 (2011).449
57. Endriss, U., Kraus, S., Lang, J. & Wooldridge, M. Incentive engineering for boolean450
games. IJCAI ’11 2602–2607 (2011).451
58. Wooldridge, M. Bad equilibria (and what to do about them). ECAI ’12 6–11 (2012).452
26
59. Levit, V., Grinshpoun, T., Meisels, A. & Bazzan, A. L. C. Taxation search in boolean453
games. In AAMAS ’13, Saint Paul, MN, USA, May 6-10, 2013, 183–190 (2013).454
60. Harrenstein, P., Turrini, P. & Wooldridge, M. Hard and soft equilibria in boolean games.455
In AAMAS ’14, Paris, France, May 5-9, 2014, 845–852 (2014).456
61. Gokhale, C. S. & Traulsen, A. Evolutionary games in the multiverse. Proceedings of the457
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107, 5500–5504 (2010).458
62. Han, T. A., Traulsen, A. & Gokhale, C. S. On equilibrium properties of evolutionary459
multiplayer games with random payoff matrices. Theoretical Population Biology 81,460
264–272 (2012).461
63. Duong, M. H. & Han, T. A. On the expected number of equilibria in a multi-player462
multi-strategy evolutionary game. Dynamic Games and Applications 1–23 (2015).463
64. Han, T. A., Lynch, S., Tran-Thanh, L. & Santos, F. C. Fostering cooperation in struc-464
tured populations through local and global interference strategies. In Proceedings of465
the Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI-18,466
289–295 (2018).467
65. Nowak, M. A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C. & Fudenberg, D. Emergence of cooperation and468
evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 646–650 (2004).469
66. Imhof, L. A., Fudenberg, D. & Nowak, M. A. Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and470
defection. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 102, 10797–10800 (2005).471
67. Han, T. A. & Lenaerts, T. A synergy of costly punishment and commitment in coopera-472
tion dilemmas. Adaptive Behavior 24, 237–248 (2016).473
27
68. Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M. & Santos, F. C. Intention Recognition, Commitment, and The474
Evolution of Cooperation. In Proceedings of IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computa-475
tion, 1–8 (IEEE Press, 2012).476
69. Hofbauer, J. & Sigmund, K. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (Cambridge477
University Press, 1998).478
70. Fudenberg, D. & Imhof, L. A. Imitation processes with small mutations. Journal of479
Economic Theory 131, 251–262 (2005).480
71. Karlin, S. & Taylor, H. E. A First Course in Stochastic Processes (Academic Press, New481
York, 1975).482
72. Han, T. A., Tran-Thanh, L. & Jennings, N. R. The cost of interference in evolving483
multiagent systems. In AAMAS’2015, 1719–1720 (2015).484
28
Figure Legends485
29
0 20 40 60 80 100
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
t
Co
op
Le
v
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
t
Ex
pV
isi
ts
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
2
4
6
8
t
To
tal
In
ve
stm
en
t
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 n
um
be
r o
f v
is
its
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 c
os
t
t
b. c.
0 20 40 60 80 100
.
.
.
0.6
0.8
1.0
         
         
      
θ=1
θ=5
θ=10
θ=20
θ=40
θ=60
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
le
ve
l a.
Figure 1. Level of cooperation (panel a), expected number of interferences (panel b), and
expected total cost of interference (panel c), all as a function of the interference threshold
t and for different values of θ. In panel (b) and (c), the results are scaled by Log(10).
Parameters: R = 1, T = 2, P = 0, S = −1; N = 100; β = 0.1.
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Figure 2. Optimal value t? leading to an investment strategy with a minimal value of the
expected cost of investment (EC), which guarantees at least ω frequency of cooperation.
We study for varying individual cost of investment, θ, and for different intensities of selection,
β (namely, β = 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, and 1, respectively, in panels a, b, c and d). In general, the
value of t? decreases with θ and increases with ω (comparing ω = 0.1, 0.5, 0.7 and 0.9). When
β is sufficiently small (panels a, b and c), an intermediate value of t? is always observed, while
when β is sufficiently large (panel d), t? must be the largest possible, i.e. t? = N − 1.
Parameters: R = 1, T = 2, P = 0, S = −1; N = 100.
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Figure 3. Range of t (grey area) that leads to investment schemes being more
cost-efficient than FULL-INVEST (i.e. t = N − 1), guaranteeing at least ω fraction of
cooperation, for varying per-individual investment cost θ. We plot for different values of ω:
ω = 0.1 (left column), ω = 0.5 (middle column), ω = 0.9 (right column), and for different
values of β: β = 0.01 (top row) and β = 0.1 (bottom row). In general, for a given ω, there is a
large range of t leading to a more cost-efficient investment scheme than the FULL-INVEST.
Parameters: R = 1, T = 2, P = 0, S = −1; N = 100
